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O P I N I O N  
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Derrick Mack, who was at all relevant times a prisoner at SCI Dallas in 
Pennsylvania, filed two grievances against various Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections employees (“Defendants”).  One grievance related to the inadequacies of the 
prison law library and Mack’s difficulty in obtaining the New Jersey State Rules of 
Court.  The other related to the poor condition of the prison’s basketball court and 
injuries Mack suffered as a result of SCI Dallas’s failure to fix the court.  Both grievances 
were ultimately dismissed because Mack failed to provide the Secretary’s Office of 
Inmate Grievances and Appeals (the “Secretary”) with required documents.  Mack then 
filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Defendants, alleging multiple violations of his 
constitutional rights.  Defendants, relying on Mack’s previously-mentioned failure to 
provide the Secretary with necessary documents, filed a motion for summary judgment, 
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asserting that Mack failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act (the “PLRA”).  The District Court granted the motion.  
Mack now appeals.  For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm.  
SCI Dallas has a three-step procedure for the review of inmate grievances.  The 
procedure is detailed in Department of Corrections Administrative Directive 804 (“DC-
ADM 804”).  Step 1 requires an inmate to submit a grievance in writing to the Facility 
Grievance Coordinator within fifteen days of the events giving rise to his grievance.  All 
grievances are assigned a tracking number and entered into the Department of 
Corrections’ Automated Inmate Grievance Tracking System.  The Facility Grievance 
Coordinator then assigns the grievance to a Grievance Officer, who conducts the initial 
review of the grievance and provides a written response to the inmate.  If the inmate is 
dissatisfied with the Grievance Officer’s decision, he may proceed to Step 2 and file an 
appeal with the Facility Manager.  If the inmate is dissatisfied with the outcome of the 
Step 2 appeal, he may proceed to Step 3 and file an appeal with the Secretary.  Step 3 
requires the inmate to provide the Secretary with photocopies of (1) the initial grievance; 
(2) the Grievance Officer’s decision; (3) the appeal to the Facility Manager; and (4) the 
Facility Manager’s decision.  “Failure to provide the proper documentation may result in 
the appeal being dismissed.”  (A. 137.)  Mack’s compliance with Step 3 is at issue in this 
case.         
 In December 2007, Mack submitted two grievances to the Facility Grievance 
Coordinator at SCI Dallas.  The grievances were entered into the Tracking System and 
assigned to Grievance Officers.  Both Grievance Officers ruled against Mack.  Mack 
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appealed these decisions to the Facility Manager, who affirmed the Grievance Officers’ 
decisions.  Mack then proceeded to Step 3 and appealed to the Secretary.  Mack 
maintains that he included all the necessary photocopies and/or attachments in his 
appeals.  The Tracking System indicates that Mack failed to provide photocopies of his 
appeals to the Facility Manager (the “Step 2 appeals”) for both grievances.   
 On February 14, 2008, the Chief Grievance Officer in the Secretary’s Office sent 
Mack notices that he had not properly complied with the grievance appeal procedure (the 
“Notices”).  In relevant part, the Notices stated: 
Review of the information you provided indicates that your appeal is incomplete.  
You are not permitted to appeal to this Office unless you have complied with the 
procedures established in the DC-ADM 804 requiring that all documentation 
relevant to the appeal be provided upon appeal.  Therefore, you have ten (10) 
working days from the date of this notice to provide this Office with all completed 
documents necessary for conducting final review.  A failure to provide the missing 
information (identified below) within this time period will result in a dismissal of 
your appeal. 
 
(A. 146.)  The Notices identified the “Required Information” that was missing as Mack’s 
“appeal to Facility Manager, signed & dated” and instructed Mack to “forward a copy” of 
the document to the Secretary’s office.  (Id.)  At the very bottom of the page, the Notices 
noted that “[e]ach facility has established local procedures for photocopying services” 
and that if an inmate is indigent, “DOC policy provides that copies may be made at no 
cost [so the inmate can] . . . submit the document required to appeal [his] grievance.”  
(Id.) 
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Mack responded to the Notices by providing the Secretary with handwritten copies 
of his Step 2 appeals.
1
  Mack’s submission did not explain why he did not provide 
photocopies, and Mack concedes that he did not inform prison officials that he was 
unable to procure photocopies of the requested documents, which he now contends on 
appeal.  On February 28, 2008, the Secretary dismissed Mack’s appeals because Mack 
failed to provide the photocopies that the Notices requested.     
 On June 9, 2008, Mack filed suit against Defendants, alleging multiple violations 
of his constitutional rights.  Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that 
Mack’s claims were barred because he did not properly exhaust his administrative 
remedies due to his failure to comply with the Notices.  The District Court agreed with 
Defendants and granted the motion.  Mack then filed a motion to vacate judgment, which 
the District Court construed as a motion for reconsideration, and denied for the reasons 
stated in its summary judgment order.   
                                              
1
 At oral argument, Mack suggested for the first time that he submitted his original Step 2 
appeals in response to the Notices.  We find this assertion difficult to credit.  DC-ADM 
804 states that “[d]ocuments submitted in support of a grievance become part of the 
grievance and will not be returned.”  (A. 137.)  Mack provides no evidence that prison 
officials ignored this guideline and returned his Step 2 appeals after he filed them in 
2007.  Thus, we fail to see how Mack could have been in possession of his original 
documents when he responded to the Notices in 2008.  As such, our opinion credits the 
more plausible position that Mack advanced in his appellate brief that he submitted 
handwritten copies of his Step 2 appeals in response to the Notices, (Brief of Appellant at 
15, 16, 25; Reply Brief of Appellant at 5),—not his original documents.  We also note 
that the Secretary’s Office appropriately questioned the validity of the handwritten copies 
of Mack’s appeals to the Facility Manager.  The date of the appeal on the handwritten 
copies preceded the Initial Review decision.  (A. 148-49, 190, 192.)  According to DC-
ADM 804, however, an appeal to the Facility Manager cannot be filed until the inmate 
has received the Initial Review decision.           
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 Mack now appeals to this Court, advancing two theories.
2
  First, he contends that 
Defendants failed to prove the affirmative defense of “failure to exhaust” because they 
did not prove that he did not submit his Step 2 appeals when he filed his appeals to the 
Secretary.  Under this theory, Mack’s compliance with the February 14 Notices is 
irrelevant because according to Mack, if Defendants cannot prove that he did not comply 
with the original requirement, then he should not be penalized for not complying with the 
“additional” requirement in the Notices.  Second, Mack argues that he substantially 
complied with the Notices because (1) his failure to provide photocopies of his Step 2 
appeals was only a “minor” error, as SCI Dallas had copies of the appeals that the 
Secretary could have accessed; (2) he “technically” complied with the procedures by 
providing handwritten copies of his appeals because the Notices instructed Mack to 
forward a “copy” of the requested information; and (3) the remedy was “unavailable” 
because the photocopier was broken, and he thus could not comply with the grievance 
procedures.  We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.  Doe v. 
Luzerne Cty., 660 F.3d 169, 174 (3d Cir. 2011).   
 The PLRA requires prisoners to exhaust prison grievance remedies before 
initiating a lawsuit.  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
3
  Exhaustion is mandatory and must be 
“proper,” which requires a prisoner to “us[e] all steps that the agency holds out, and [to 
                                              
2
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
3
 The exhaustion requirement states: “No action shall be brought with respect to prison 
conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner 
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative 
remedies as are available are exhausted.”   
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do] so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits).”  Woodford v. 
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (emphasis in original); see also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 
218 (2007) (“[T]he level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance 
procedures will vary from system to system and claim to claim, but it is the prison’s 
requirements . . . that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.”); Williams v. Beard, 
482 F.3d 637, 639 (3d Cir. 2007) (explaining that proper exhaustion requires a prisoner to 
“comply with all the administrative requirements”).  Although exhaustion is mandatory, a 
prisoner must only exhaust remedies that are “available.”  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).  The 
availability of an administrative remedy is a question of law that we review de novo.  Ray 
v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 291 (3d Cir. 2002).   An administrative remedy is unavailable 
when a prison official prevents a prisoner from pursuing the prison grievance process.  
See Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d Cir. 2003); Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 
113 (3d Cir. 2002).      
 Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA.  Jones, 549 U.S. at 
217; Brown, 312 F.3d at 111. 
As an initial matter, we agree with the District Court that the relevant inquiry is 
Mack’s compliance with the Notices.  Regardless of whether Mack initially sent the 
Secretary his Step 2 appeals, the Secretary did not have the documents and instructed 
Mack to submit them or his Step 3 appeals would be dismissed.  As there is no indication 
of bad faith on the part of the Secretary in not having possession of the documents, Mack 
was required to comply with this directive.  His compliance with the Notices is thus the 
appropriate subject of our analysis, and we therefore reject Mack’s first theory.         
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We also agree with the District Court that Mack did not properly comply with the 
Notices.  First, we do not accept Mack’s argument that his failure to provide photocopies 
of his Step 2 appeals was only a “minor” error.  The Secretary must be able to review an 
inmate’s previous submissions in order to evaluate the merits of his final appeal.  The 
grievance procedure thus, not surprisingly, requires an inmate to submit his previous 
appeals to the Secretary and stresses the importance of the requirement by warning the 
inmate that a failure to provide the documents “may result in the appeal being 
dismissed.”  (A. 137.)  In this case, the importance of the requirement was put in further 
relief by the Notices, which referred to the documents as “Required Information” and 
explicitly instructed Mack that if he did not submit the missing documents, his appeal 
would be dismissed.  (A. 146.)  As there is no evidence in the record that suggests that 
DC-ADM 804 and the Notices overstated the necessity of an inmate providing a 
photocopy of his earlier appeals to the final reviewer, we cannot conclude that Mack’s 
error was only minor and therefore will not disturb the decision of the District Court on 
this basis.
4
    
                                              
4
 Mack relies on language in Woodford that an inmate must comply “with an agency’s 
deadlines and other critical procedural rules”, 548 U.S. at 90-91 (emphasis added), to 
argue that he did not procedurally default by not complying with the photocopy 
requirement because that requirement is not a “critical” rule.  Mack does not explain why 
he believes the rule is not critical, but we deduce that it is for the same reasons that he 
contends his error was “minor”: the Secretary could have accessed Mack’s Step 2 appeals 
even if Mack failed to provide them.  We find this argument fails for the same reason that 
we conclude the error was not minor.  Thus, even if Mack is correct that he must comply 
with only the “critical” rules in grievance procedure, rather than all the rules, the outcome 
of his appeal would be the same.         
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Second, we find that the Notices were clear that Mack needed to provide 
photocopies and thus reject Mack’s argument that he technically complied with the 
Secretary’s request by providing handwritten copies of the documents.  The Notices 
specifically reference the DC-ADM 804 requirements, which state that photocopies are 
required.  In addition, the Notices stated that Mack needed to provide his “appeal to 
Facility Manager, signed & dated.”  (Id.)  The Notices also stated that indigent inmates 
could make copies for free so that they could “submit the documentation required to 
appeal [their] grievance.”  (Id.)  All of these facts make it clear that a photocopy was 
required.  As a result, we do not find that Mack’s providing handwritten copies of his 
Step 2 appeals “technically” complied with the Notices and thus will not disturb the 
decision of the District Court on this ground.
5
   
Finally, we do not agree that the remedy was unavailable.  Mack had ten days to 
comply with the Notices, but at no time in those ten days did he alert anyone that the 
photocopier was broken.
6
  His response to the Notices also did not indicate any reason 
why he was not complying or unable to comply.  We decline to hold that a step in the 
process is “unavailable” where an inmate does not give the prison officials the 
opportunity to remedy the situation.  Indeed, such a holding would be contrary to the 
purpose of the PLRA.  It would allow prisoners to avoid review by prison officials by 
                                              
5
 We can well understand the Secretary’s position that handwritten documents are not 
reliable and allowing them could encourage the submission of documents that are not the 
precise replicas of what was originally submitted.   
6
 Indeed, we note that the Initial Review decision indicated that “a new copier” had been 
installed in December, 2007.  (A. 192.)  The Facility Manager acknowledged as much in 
his decision.  (A. 191.)  Thus, it appears that a copier was available when Mack filed his 
appeal to the Facility Manager.   
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concealing their inability to comply with the grievance procedures and then arguing to a 
district court, after being dismissed on procedural grounds, that they were unable to 
comply with the procedures.  Thus, as there is no evidence that prison officials actively 
prevented Mack from complying with the photocopy requirement, we will not disturb the 
District Court’s ruling that Mack failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies.   
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the order of the District Court.   
